Spinoza, Deleuze and the question of difference

Since I last posted I've finished Derrida's Spurs/Eperons (which is amazing, I could barely sleep afterward) and Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling (which I loved as well, though I was puzzled at Kierkegaard's confrontation with ethics, wondering why he never strictly draws a line between ethics and morality, though his analysis of faith-as-limit in metaphysics is beautiful).

Though it may seem a divergence from the general investigations here, I would, we could say, differ from such a judgment, at least outright. Many ways in which we think are partner as well to a 'fascist operational schema' (if one dares to be so assertive), and thus deserve some attention. It may seem rambling incoherently, but I'd like to flush out various things in a general build up. I would, quite humbly, liken such an approach to Nietzsche's seemingly chaotic use of aporias, which build together for a general critique.

This time, the problem(s) of difference consumes much of my current reading. I've been mulling over the quote of Derrida's posted last time, and I think he's on to something; namely, we cannot do without what we denounce, we are often implicated in their crimes, we use their tools and work in a framework at least somewhat in common with those we denounce. The problem of difference is loud and clear in Spinoza's Ethics and his reflections on the all-encompassing nature of God, sameness/difference and presence. I have, in the past day or so, been moving through Gilles Deleuze's book on Spinoza, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. Deleuze is always a curious character for me, as I admire him deeply, in the way that he is brushed off or passed over. His closeness, and many times complentary pursuits, to Foucault and Derrida, is well-noted, though often underappreciated (in my mind) and he's classed to a secondary position to the two of them, though I can't help but wondering on the influence he had on both Foucault and Derrida in their respective work (Foucault, to his credit, loved to drop Deleuze when he could, while Derrida does only sparingly).

As far I've read, Deleuze's book on Spinoza is further indicator of his brilliance. While he isn't of the sweeping gestures that Foucault was so talented in articulating nor the intimacy of Derrida, he has such a sharp eye that he canot be ignored. Deleuze is correct point out, in my mind, that Spinoza neglects the strictly 'negative,' but in 'the reproach that Hegl will make to Spinoza, that he ignored the negative and its power, lies the glory and innocence of Spinoza, his own discovery' (13). While one can say that Deleuze takes certain liberties with Spinoza (an introduction of Marx and Nietzsche), I think he is right on in this. Obviously, both Marx and Nietzsche have not been born yet, but the ways in which Spinoza concieves God-as-infinite and substance have a certain bearing on their similarities to the discourses of both Marx and Nietzsche. Much of structural determinism (the latest apostle named Slavoj Zizek) seeks to arrest time, to take control of movement and flucuation, to determine the truth(s) of a system that exists prior to time, positing a 'totality' that is supposed to be all-encompassing. Spinoza, and Deleuze seems so far in agreement, in my reading, rests slightly opposed to this deterministic view. There is a notion of gradient and threshold, of becoming and existence (granted, Spinoza maintains the Cartesian hierarchy that Heidegger will come to critique), gives Spinoza a bit of an edge of the Aristotelian determinism, as Spinoza sees God within everything, where God is infinite. There are certain problems, granted, with naming the infinite, of defining something which has so limit, but it also enables Spinoza to put his system up for flucuation, giving it a more liquid nature. Substance, and the greater knowledge thereof, found as coming closer to God, suggests a gradient of movement, but God being infinite and in all things, there is always a greater movement towards God and the full threshold is never reached. One sees elements of this in Foucault's discussions of power/resistance and Derrida's writings on the impossibilities of full deconstruction.

Spinoza also opens the question of difference and strays from dialectical determinations, instead examining multitudes of substance that are common, have sameness we could say, in their 'attributes' but possess difference in essence. As Deleuze notes, the 'attributes are distinct in reality: no attribute needs another, or anything pertaining to another, in order to be conceived. Hence they express substantial qualities that are absolutely simple' (51-52). While these are 'distinct in reality,' Spinoza places them in contingency, a relational infinity, that suggests some deference. Differance (accent on the a, I can't find it on my computer), perhaps. Spinoza's usage of contigency is, for me, one of the most notable things about the Ethics.

In the previous discussion of Foucault, we examined, albeit briefly, 'Panopticism,' which posits a similar 'infinity' conceived in a sphere of 'wholeness,' though this wholeness is impossible to strictly posit or name. Foucault complicates Spinoza's claim that attributes can be 'distinct' but Foucault's implicit emphasis on agents and agency (one needs a multitude of people to make the Panopticon work after all) retains a bit of this Spinozist framework.

Up to critique and possible misreading, but these have been points of interest recently.

Deleuze, Gilles. Spinoza: Practical Philosophy. Trans: Robert Hurley. San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988.